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1 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: DRUG 
ENFORECMENT & ITS IMPACT ON  
THE DEPORTATION OF LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENTS 
Wilber A. Barillas* 
Abstract: The United States’ legislation and jurisprudence regulating the 
deportation of legal permanent residents is harsh by many standards. The 
harshness of the legal regime is particularly acute as it relates to minor 
drug crimes. Under current U.S. law, possession of a single pill of Xanax 
leads to mandatory detention and can even lead to deportation. This 
Note explores the impact that the United States’ drug policy has had on 
deportation law, the current legislative regime surrounding drug-based 
deportations, the changing landscape of drug enforcement, and the lack 
of meaningful protection that current legislation and jurisprudence af-
fords permanent residents facing deportation due to minor drug crimes. 
Finally, this Note argues that the harshest aspects of the United States’ 
drug-based deportation laws can be mitigated, either via the legislature or 
the judiciary, so that only truly dangerous criminal non-citizens face the 
prospect of mandatory detention and deportation. 
Introduction 
 Jerry Lemaine legally immigrated to New York from Haiti when he 
was three years old.1 He took advantage of the educational opportuni-
ties available to him in the United States and enrolled at the Hunter 
Business School to earn a degree in nursing.2 He helped financially 
support his divorced mother and his sister who suffered from a brain 
disorder.3 Nevertheless, Mr. Lemaine is subject to a different standard 
of justice within the U.S. legal system because of his status as a legal 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Comments Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice 
(2013–2014). 
1 Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May Lead to Deportation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
31, 2010, at A17. 
2 Id. Jerry Lemaine was majoring in nursing studies. Id. 
3 Id. 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:1 
permanent resident.4 Acts that would have only minor consequences 
for citizens can have dire consequences for someone like Mr. Lemaine.5 
  In January 2007, police officers found a marijuana cigarette in Mr. 
Lemaine’s pocket.6 Following the counsel of a lawyer, Mr. Lemaine pled 
guilty and paid the $100 New York penalty for possession of marijuana.7 
Soon after his guilty plea, immigration authorities arrested Mr. Lemaine 
and placed him in a detention center in Texas.8 
 Mr. Lemaine spent three years in various Texas detention centers 
as his case worked its way up the court systems.9 While in the detention 
centers, Mr. Lemaine was subject to physical and verbal racial abuse, 
lost forty-five pounds, and suffered from depression.10 When he was at 
his lowest point, Mr. Lemaine had to be placed on a ten day suicide 
watch.11 
 The government targeted Mr. Lemaine because he had a prior 
charge for possession of marijuana—a charge from when Mr. Lemaine 
was fifteen, which the court had dismissed.12 Mr. Lemaine was sent to a 
Texas detention center so that the case could be tried in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which is known as a deportation friendly circuit.13 Under Fifth Cir-
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006) (making almost all narcotic offenses a 
basis for deportation). 
6 Bernstein, supra note 1. 
7 Id. Interestingly, whether lawyers should consider immigration issues when counsel-
ing legal residents on criminal matters was taken up in the landmark Supreme Court case 
of Padilla v. Kentucky, where the Court held that lawyers have a constitutional duty to in-
form immigrant criminal defendants of possible immigration consequences. 559 U.S. 356, 
374 (2010). 
8 Bernstein, supra note 1. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. Mr. Lemaine was placed in isolation for his own protection following the beat-
ings. Id. 
11 Id. He did not see a psychiatrist for a week after being placed on the suicide watch. 
Id. 
12 Id. Generally, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) prefers to target indi-
viduals charged with multiple crimes. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Guid-
ance to the Use of Detainer (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
detention-reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf (explaining that ICE’s policy is to focus on re-
cidivist criminals for removal purposes) [hereinafter Morton Memo]. 
13 See Bernstein, supra note 1. The Fifth Circuit has adhered to a strict reading of the Il-
legal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which allows for the 
automatic deportations of immigrants, even legal immigrants, for a wide array of crimes. 
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.); see also 
United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos, 412 F.3d 572, 576–77 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
non-citizen’s misdemeanor conviction for possession of codeine made him automatically 
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cuit precedent, Mr. Lemaine’s second charge for possession of mari-
juana made him a recidivist felon and thus automatically ineligible for 
bond or relief from deportation.14 The Fifth Circuit ultimately decided 
to suspend Mr. Lemaine’s case while awaiting the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder.15 
 Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo came to the United States when he 
was five years old as a Legal Permanent Resident (“LPR”).16 His mother 
is a naturalized citizen, his two sisters are citizens, his four children are 
citizens, and his wife is a citizen.17 In 2004, Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo pled 
guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced to confinement for 
twenty days in a Texas jail.18 In 2005, he pled nolo contendere to pos-
sessing one tablet of Xanax without a prescription.19 In 2006, on the 
basis of his second conviction, the federal government initiated re-
moval proceedings against Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo.20 
 Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo appeared without an attorney at his immi-
gration hearing, but nevertheless managed to apply for discretionary 
relief, known as a waiver, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).21 The Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) tried to block Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo’s 
application for a waiver on the basis that he had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and thus was ineligible for waiver.22 DHS argued that 
because Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo could have been charged as a recidivist 
felon based on his two misdemeanor possession charges, he had com-
mitted an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.23 Three differ-
                                                                                                                      
deportable because he could have been charged as a felon under federal law); Bryan Lo-
negan, American Diaspora: The Deportation of Lawful Residents from the United States and the 
Destruction of Their Families, 32 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 55, 60–61 (2007) (explaining 
the effects of the 1996 Act). 
14 Bernstein, supra note 1; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006) (stating that non-citizens 
charged with a drug crime can be released from detention only if they are helping the 
government as a witness in a criminal investigation). 
15 See 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010); Bernstein, supra note 1. Jerry Lemaine was released 
from detention after a new deportation officer decided that Jerry was a good candidate for 
release. Bernstein, supra note 1. 
16 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2580. 




21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006) (stating that the Attorney General can cancel re-
moval for an alien that has been in the United States for seven continuous years, at least 
five of those years as a permanent resident, so long as the alien “has not been convicted of 
any aggravated felony”); Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583. 
22 In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 390 (BIA 2007). 
23 Id. 
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ent courts ruled against Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo and agreed with DHS 
that he was ineligible for waiver.24 
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled the lower courts and 
held that for immigration purposes, a non-citizen cannot be labeled a 
recidivist felon unless the state actually convicted him as one.25 Despite 
Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo’s victory, Justice Stevens ended the opinion on 
an ominous note: “Carachuri–Rosendo, and others in his position, may 
now seek cancellation of removal and thereby avoid the harsh conse-
quence of mandatory removal. But he will not avoid the fact that his 
conviction makes him, in the first instance, removable.”26 
 In the United States, immigration discussions tend to center 
around illegal immigration.27 Often absent from the dialogue is wheth-
er or not the justice system in place for legal immigrants is itself fair.28 
Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo and Jerry Lemaine’s cases show the ex-
tremes to which our deportation system will go to ensure that it meets 
its self-imposed yearly deportation quotas, and how, in the eyes of de-
portation law, an immigrant’s legal status and time in this nation hold 
little weight.29 In particular, their cases demonstrate the harsher aspects 
of drug-based deportation laws.30 
 U.S. law recognizes a distinction between different types of drug 
crimes for citizens, but such a distinction is almost non-existent for le-
gal permanent residents facing deportation.31 Possession of a single pill 
of Xanax without a prescription is a Class A misdemeanor in Texas, 
which carries one of the lowest criminal penalties possible.32 Possession 
                                                                                                                      
24 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583–84. 
25 Id. at 2589 (“The mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct . . . could have au-
thorized a felony conviction under federal law is insufficient to satisfy the statutory com-
mand that a noncitizen be ‘convicted of a[n] aggravated felony’ before he loses the oppor-
tunity to seek cancellation of removal.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3))). 
26 Id. 
27 Lonegan, supra note 13, at 56 (noting the lack of discussion on the impact of U.S. 
immigration law on legal permanent residents). 
28 See id. 
29 See Bernstein, supra note 1; Leaked ICE Internal Memo, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement (May 04, 2012), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/603861-ice-documents.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (making reference to a 
quota). 
30 See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2589; Bernstein, supra note 1 (detailing how two 
possession of marijuana misdemeanors led to an LPR’s three-year detention). 
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that any drug crime other than a single 
conviction for possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana makes an LPR deportable). 
32 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.03 (West 2011); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 481.104 (West 2010) (placing Xanax—alprazolam—in Penalty Group 3); Tex. Health & 
Safety Code Ann. § 481.117 (West 2010) (stating that possession of a controlled sub-
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of methamphetamine is a state jail felony in Texas, which is the highest 
default criminal penalty possible.33 For a legal permanent resident, 
however, both crimes trigger the exact same deportation process—a 
process that has the potential of depriving an individual “of all that 
makes life worth living.”34 
 Recently, drug-based offenses have been a powerful tool in the de-
portation of non-citizens.35 Over the past three years they have ac-
counted for the majority of legal immigrant deportations.36 Addition-
ally, the total number of legal immigrants deported for drug-based 
offenses has increased every year over the past three years.37 
 This Note addresses an LPR’s legal struggles in deportation pro-
ceedings due to the government’s overly broad stance on narcotics. 
Part I of this Note explores the legal implications of having LPR status, 
and the role that the War on Drugs has played on deportation policies. 
Part II delves into the legislative regime of drug-based deportations. 
Part III explores the limited role that judges play in drug-based depor-
tation proceedings. Part IV discusses recent legal developments in do-
mestic drug laws and how they interplay with the drug-based deporta-
tion regime. Finally, Part V proposes three potential solutions to 
mitigate the harsh effects of the current drug-based deportation laws. 
I. The Legal Permanent Resident, Drugs, & Deportation 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) and the Antiterrorism 
                                                                                                                      
stance categorized under Penalty Group 3 is a Class A misdemeanor). This explains why 
Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo received only ten days in prison for his possession of Xanax convic-
tion. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2582. 
33 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.04 (West 2011) (stating that a state jail felony, the 
most severe category of felony, is reserved for the most serious offenses); Tex. Health & 
Safety Code Ann. § 481.102 (West 2010) (stating that methamphetamine is a controlled 
substance under Penalty Group 1); Health & Safety § 481.115 (stating that possession of 
a controlled substance categorized under Penalty Group 1 is a state felony). 
34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
35 See Jeff Yates et al., A War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of 
“Drug Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 Md. L. Rev. 875, 
880 (2005) (detailing the spike in drug-based deportations, and deportations in general, 
following the expansion of the War on Drugs). 
36 John Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigra-
tion Statistics, Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2011, at 6 (2011), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/ 
enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. 
37 Id. 
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).38 These laws ush-
ered in the new deportation era, crippling judicial oversight by allowing 
for mandatory detention and mandatory deportation.39 Part of the rea-
soning behind these laws was the association of immigration with nar-
cotic abuse and trafficking.40 To appreciate the impact of these laws, an 
understanding of what a legal permanent resident’s status entails is nec-
essary.41 
A. What Is a Legal Permanent Resident? 
 A legal permanent resident is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101 as a per-
son who has “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege 
of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accor-
dance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.”42 
Becoming a legal permanent resident can take years and requires the 
immigrant to show his general admissibility into the United States.43 
For example, LPR status is unavailable to immigrants that show a likeli-
hood of engaging in criminal activity, adhering to political activity con-
trary to U.S. interests, or displaying a likelihood of requiring public as-
sistance.44 
                                                                                                                      
38 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
and 18 U.S.C.); Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1936, 1936, 
1938 (2000) (citing to both Acts). 
39 Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1936, 1938. In the decade leading up to 1996, Congress 
had passed increasingly harsh immigration laws, but the 1996 laws were the most expansive 
and far-reaching. See Yates et al., supra note 35, at 876–77 (detailing some of the laws 
passed in 1988 and 1990 that made narcotics offenses automatic triggers for deportation). 
40 Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1944; Yates et al., supra note 35, at 876 (stating that pro-
visions to combat drug trafficking were particularly prevalent in the reforms of the late 
1980s). 
41 See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About 
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1913–14 (2000) [hereinafter Kan-
stroom I] (discussing how the “permanence” of permanent resident has been deteriorated 
over time). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006). 
43 See, e.g., Elise Brozovich, Note, Prospects for Democratic Change: Non-Citizen Suffrage in 
America, 23 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 403, 430 (2002) (detailing the specific hurdles that 
immigrants have to overcome in order to become permanent legal residents); Dinesh 
Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out! The Crumbling Distinction Between 
the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
135, 138–40 (2008) (explaining that “[a]chieving LPR status is usually the end result of a 
tortuous (and torturous) process, often through more than one federal agency”). 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (detailing the extensive grounds of inadmissibility that an 
LPR must pass); Brozovich, supra note 43, at 430. 
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 Once an immigrant has become an LPR, his rights are very similar 
to those of a citizen.45 For example, LPRs have the same access to 
American schools that citizens do, including financial aid.46 LPRs have 
the same due process and equal protection rights that citizens enjoy in 
criminal and civil proceedings.47 LPRs can even hold certain public of-
fices if allowed by the state’s legislature.48 
 Of course, permanent residence is not solely about benefits; LPRs, 
like citizens, must pay taxes.49 In fact, according to a 1997 study by the 
National Academy of Science, immigrants contribute roughly $1800 
more per person in taxes than they receive in benefits.50 Additionally, 
in New York alone in 1995, LPRs paid $18.2 billion in taxes—equivalent 
to 15.5 percent of the state’s total tax intake.51 Perhaps the biggest dif-
ference between LPRs and citizens is the fact that LPRs cannot vote and 
are subject to deportation following certain criminal convictions— 
drug-related convictions featured prominently among them.52 
                                                                                                                      
45 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952) (reasoning that “[u]nder our 
law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, but in others has 
never been conceded legal parity with the citizen”). There are a variety of methods under 
which a non-citizen can become a legal permanent resident, with the most common being 
sponsorship through family or employment. 2 Michael D. Greenberg, et al., Immigra-
tion Practice Manual § 22.1.1 (2d ed. 2012) (highlighting the different procedures 
under which a non-citizen can attain LPR status). Under every path for attaining LPR sta-
tus, the non-citizen must pass the grounds of inadmissibility, which are statutory barriers 
that prevent certain non-citizens from gaining admission to the United States due to 
health, criminal, immigration, or policy concerns. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see also Greenberg, 
et al., supra, § 22.2. Attaining LPR status is always discretionary, and the federal govern-
ment can deny LPR status even if a non-citizen meets all of the legal requirements. 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(a). Furthermore, the grounds of inadmissibility can serve as a basis for de-
portation while a non-citizen is an LPR—in other words, an LPR is always subject to both 
the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006); Alina Das, 
The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigra-
tion Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1682 (2011). 
46 See Many Non-U.S. Citizens Qualify for Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.: Fed. 
Student Aid, http://studentaid.ed.gov/eligibility/non-us-citizens (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
47 See Lonegan, supra note 13, at 57; Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 43, at 140. 
48 Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 43, at 140. 
49 Lonegan, supra note 13, at 57. 
50 Brozovich, supra note 43, at 438. 
51 See Jeffrey S. Passel & Rebecca L. Clark, Immigrants in New York: Their Legal Status, In-
comes, & Taxes, Urban Inst., http://www.urban.org/publications/407432.html (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2014). 
52 Lonegan, supra note 13, at 57; see also Simanski & Sapp, supra note 36, at 6 (detailing 
the effects of drug-based deportations). 
8 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:1 
B. The Rise of Drug-Based Deportations 
 Deportations of LPRs for drug-related crimes began in 1922.53 Ini-
tially, LPRs could receive judicial relief in drug-based deportation pro-
ceedings.54 Nevertheless, this type of judicial oversight was short lived 
and was eliminated in 1952.55 Although drug-based offenses have his-
torically led to deportation, the number of LPRs deported for such of-
fenses began to increase congruently with the increased federal efforts 
against drug crimes during the 1980s.56 
 The War on Drugs as we know it originated during former Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan’s administration after he ran on a strong anti-
crime platform.57 Upon Reagan’s declaration of the War on Drugs, the 
FBI anti-drug funding increased from $8 million to $95 million.58 Dur-
ing the Reagan and Bush I administrations, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency’s (“DEA”) and the Department of Defense’s anti-drug alloca-
tions also increased.59 The “crack-cocaine epidemic” of the mid-1980s 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Narcotic Drug Act of 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596, 597 (making narcotics offenses 
a deportable crime); see also Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1926) 
(stating that Congress “meant to declare that violators of the Narcotic Act were considered 
a class not to be entitled to any sort of prescriptive right to remain in this country”). 
54 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1988)) (establishing the Judicial Recommendation Against 
Deportation (“JRAD”), which allowed immigrants to appeal to the judicial branch to sus-
pend deportation proceedings); Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1934), reh’g 
granted, 78 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1935) (dismissing the first case due to lack of jurisdiction). In 
Dang Nam v. Bryan, a non-citizen was convicted of possession of opium. 74 F.2d at 379. The 
trial judge recommended that the non-citizen not be deported, but the immigration agen-
cy ignored the trial judge’s recommendation and entered deportation proceedings against 
the non-citizen. Id. The circuit court held that the JRAD applied to narcotics charges and 
the recommendation of the trial judge was controlling. Id. at 381. 
55 See The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran Act), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 
163, 215 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (eliminating JRAD review 
of narcotics-based deportation proceedings). 
56 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011 Year-
book of Immigration Statistics 102 (2012); Yates et al., supra note 35, at 880–82 (stating 
that in 1981 there were only 310 drug-related deportations—and 8,183 in 1990); see, e.g., 
How the War on Drugs Influences the Health and Well-being of Minority Communities, Drug Pol-
icy Research Ctr. (RAND Drug Policy Research Ctr., Santa Monica, Cal.), June 2001, at 
1, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2010/CP 
201–2001–06.pdf (noting how drug-based incarcerations went up sixteen-fold between 
1983 and 1998) [hereinafter War on Drugs]. 
57 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness 48–49 (2012). It should be noted that while President Reagan imple-
mented the War on Drugs, the idea itself actually originated in the Nixon administration. 
Id. at 46–47. 
58 Id. at 49. 
59 Id. The Department of Defense’s allocations increased from $33 million in 1981 to 
$1.042 billion in 1991, and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s allocations increased from $86 
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led to even stronger anti-drug laws, further strengthening the Reagan 
Administration’s “get tough on crime” platform.60 
 Not wanting to appear as being soft on crime, Democrats under 
the Clinton Administration expanded state and local police forces and 
distributed more than sixteen billion dollars in state prison grants.61 
The result of these funding increases was immediate: the prison popu-
lation increased from around 300,000 at the onset of the War on Drugs 
to more than two million people by 2006.62 Drug convictions accounted 
for the majority of that increase.63 
 LPRs were severely affected politically and practically by the War 
on Drugs.64 The number of non-citizens deported annually more than 
quadrupled from 17,379 in 1981 to 69,680 in 1996.65 After IIRIRA, 
which further increased the mandatory deportable drug-based of-
fenses, the number of LPRs deported for drug offenses increased to 
114,432 removals in 1997.66 That number has increased every year to 
391,953 deported immigrants in 2012.67 IIRIRA was passed because of 
the perceived increase in drug crimes among immigrants, not taking 
                                                                                                                      
million to $1.026 billion. Id. Interestingly, even though the Reagan Administration decided 
to focus on drug-related crimes, “less than 2% of the American public viewed drugs as the 
most important issue facing the nation” in 1982. Id. Another interesting note, according to 
Alexander, is that the budget of the National Institute on Drug Abuse was actually reduced 
for the time period between 1981 and 1984 from $274 million to $57 million. Id. at 50. 
60 See id. at 52–54. In 1985, crack cocaine, a cheaper and more intense form of powder 
cocaine, spread across poor inner-city neighborhoods. Id. at 51. The drug’s cheap and 
highly addictive nature caused a spike in inner-city violence that caught the attention of 
the national media. Id. at 51–52. The national media intensely focused on the effects of 
crack cocaine on inner-city neighborhoods to the point of hyperbole, famously coining the 
phrase, “crack cocaine epidemic.” Id. at 51–53. 
61 Id. at 56. 
62 Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 33 (2d ed. 2006). 
63 Id. Drug-based crimes alone accounted for two-thirds of the rise in the federal pris-
on population between 1985 and 2000. Id. Half of the rise of the state prison population in 
that same time period was due to drug crimes. Id. 
64 See, e.g., Ryan D. King et al., Employment and Exile: U.S. Criminal Deportations, 1908–
2005, 117 Am. J. Soc. 1786, 1786–87 (2012) (demonstrating via statistics the rise in crimi-
nal deportations); Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1945 (stating that “[t]he likelihood of de-
portation is greater in communities that are subject to elevated levels of police activity and 
in which people are more likely to be arrested and prosecuted”). 
65 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 56, at 102. 
66 Id. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ex-
panded the definition of aggravated felony so that any crime with a sentence of one year 
or more would lead to mandatory removal, which included many drug crimes. See 
Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1939 (explaining the impact of the newly expanded aggravated 
felony category). 
67 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 56, at 102. 
10 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:1 
into account that the increase was due to stronger drug enforcement.68 
Stated differently, lawmakers used the overall increase in the prison 
population due to the drug war, which would naturally mean an in-
crease in the immigrant prison population, as a pretext for passing the 
harsher deportation laws of 1996.69 
 The following section explores the legislative deportation regime 
that was established in 1996. It also details the effects of these laws on 
LPRs. 
II. The Legislation Behind Drug-Based Deportations 
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) defines the types of drug-based offenses 
that make a non-citizen deportable.70 The statute does not distinguish 
between LPRs and other types of non-citizens—it applies generally to 
all non-citizens regardless of their immigration status.71 This section 
explores the nuances of the deportation statutes. In particular, this sec-
tion focuses on the definition of a conviction for deportation purposes, 
controlled substances, and the myriad of deportation consequences 
that accompany a drug conviction. 
A. What Is a “Conviction” for Deportation Purposes? 
 The legal definition of a criminal “conviction” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48) is broad and does not distinguish between a criminal 
and civil offense.72 In addition to a formal finding of guilt by a judge or 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (stating that IIRIRA was passed because 
“[c]riminal aliens were the fastest growing segment of the federal prison population, al-
ready constituting roughly 25% of all federal prisoners, and they formed a rapidly rising 
share of all federal prisoners”). In the words of Senator William V. Roth Jr.: 
We do know that the Federal Bureau of Prisons confines about 22,000 crimi-
nal aliens—25 percent of the total Federal prison population—and that both 
the number and percent have been growing steadily since 1980. The Justice 
Department estimates that there are about 53,000 criminal aliens in federal 
and state prisons . . . . Confinement of criminal aliens in state and federal 
prisons cost taxpayers approximately $724,000,000 in 1990. 
S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 1 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
69 See Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1944 (noting that the 1996 laws were passed due to 
the perceived “criminal alien” problem that was attributable to the overall prison in-
crease). 
70 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006) (listing “classes of deportable aliens” deportable 
for criminal offenses related to “controlled substances”). 
71 Id. Essentially this means that an LPR is treated the same as an undocumented im-
migrant when it comes to drug-based deportation proceedings. See id. 
72 Id. § 1101(a)(48); Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1942–43. 
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jury, a “conviction” under the statute includes a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere.73 It also includes situations where an LPR has admitted 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt.74 Furthermore, any kind of 
suspended sentence or probation is irrelevant for deportation pur-
poses—the sentence length of the conviction is based on the amount of 
time there is any restraint on liberty.75 Finally, a conviction can also in-
clude simple penalties, as long as the penalty is court-imposed.76 
  Under the statute, an LPR can be deported for any conviction re-
lating to a controlled substance or for simply being a drug abuser or 
addict.77 The statute’s only exception is for an LPR who has had only 
one conviction for possession of marijuana.78 This means that two con-
victions for possession of marijuana would make an LPR deportable.79 
Furthermore, the statute also applies to convictions for crimes relating 
to controlled substances, meaning that LPRs can be deported for in-
choate drug offenses such as attempted possession or possession of 
paraphernalia.80 
                                                                                                                      
73 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
74 Id. 
75 See id. § 1011(a)(48)(B); Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1942–43 (explaining how an 
LPR received a one-year suspended sentence that was counted as a one-year conviction for 
deportation purposes, which led to her deportation). 
76 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(ii) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘conviction’ means . . . a 
formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court . . . where . . . the judge has or-
dered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty . . . .”). 
77 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The statute has a broad scope: “Any alien who at any 
time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to 
a controlled substance . . . is deportable.” Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
78 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (stating that the breaking of any law relating to a controlled 
substance “other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana” makes an LPR deportable). 
79 Id. In Jerry Lemaine’s case, for example, even though he would not be automatically 
deportable as a recidivist felon following Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, he would still be 
marked as a deportable LPR under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because he had more than 
a single offense of possession of marijuana. See id.; 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010) (holding 
that an LPR could not be automatically deported as a recidivist felon unless the state had 
actually convicted him as a recidivist felon); Bernstein, supra note 1 (detailing Jerry Le-
maine’s three year detention for two possession of marijuana convictions). 
80 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Courts have given the “relating to a controlled sub-
stance” language broad meaning, as exemplified in Luu-Le v. I.N.S., where an LPR was 
found automatically deportable following a state conviction for possession of drug para-
phernalia. 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2000). The circuit court stated that it was “important 
to note that we have construed the ‘relating to’ language broadly in the past.” Id. at 915 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
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B. What Are “Controlled Substances”? 
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) adopts the same definition of controlled 
substances as the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).81 In turn, the 
CSA defines controlled substances as any substance mentioned in 21 
U.S.C. § 812.82 The purpose of Section 812 is to outlaw substances that 
have the potential for abuse, dependence, and danger to public 
health.83 The number of substances listed in Section 812 is extensive, 
featuring more than 160 controlled substances.84 Included in Section 
812 are the commonly known drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and 
methamphetamine.85 
 Section 812 does not provide the complete list of what is consid-
ered a controlled substance by the federal government.86 Congress gave 
the Attorney General the power to expand or contract this list.87 In 
practice, this has granted the Drug Enforcement Administration—an 
agency under the Department of Justice—the power to increase the 
types of substances that would fall under Section 812.88 The DEA has 
used this power, for instance, to include Adderall, Xanax, Ambien, and 
Ritalin to the list of controlled substances.89 As a result, what constitutes 
a controlled substance is an ever-expanding list, and any new drug add-
ed creates a new ground for deportation.90 
                                                                                                                      
81 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2006). 
The Controlled Substances Act is the federal legislative regime that governs the definition, 
prohibition, and penalties relating to drugs and other controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801. 
82 See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (stating that “[t]he term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug 
or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part 
B of this subchapter”). 
83 See id. § 811(c) (outlining the criteria that determines which drugs are illegal). 
84 Id. § 812. 
85 Id. 
86 Compare id. (displaying a limited number of controlled substances), with 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.11–.15 (2012) (displaying the full list of controlled substances). 
87 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (granting the Attorney General power to extend the list of illegal 
substances to any other substances that meets Section 811’s criteria). 
88 See id.; id. § 871(a) (allowing the Attorney General to delegate his duties under the 
CSA to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.01. 
89 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812 (displaying a limited number of controlled substances), with 
21 C.F.R. § 1308.11–.15 (displaying the full list of controlled substances). 
90 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (stating that the Attorney General can add to the schedule of 
drugs). 
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C. Additional Consequences of Drug-Based Crimes for LPRs 
 In addition to making a non-citizen deportable, drug-based crimes 
also make non-citizens automatically detainable, and, if the drug crime 
was not a misdemeanor, subject to mandatory deportation.91 This sec-
tion explores how drug-based crimes subject LPRs to automatic deten-
tion, prevent LPRs from escaping detention, and can eliminate any 
possibility of cancellation of deportation. 
1. Drug-Based Crimes Subject LPRs to Automatic Detention 
 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) states that the Attorney General shall (i.e., must) 
take into custody any LPR that is deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B).92 While the Attorney General has the discretion to re-
lease a non-citizen from detention on bond or parole for certain de-
portable offenses, generally he may not release an LPR who is facing 
deportation for a drug-related offense, except in very limited circum-
stances.93 Effectively, this means that any LPR who is deportable because 
he has a drug conviction, other than a single conviction for possession 
of marijuana, can be automatically placed in a detention center.94 
 Detention facilities function very similarly to prisons, and in many 
cases, LPRs are placed in actual prisons.95 The Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement agency (“ICE”) is responsible for administering the 
detention centers, which house over 320,000 immigrants each year.96 
ICE houses detainees in three different types of facilities: Service Proc-
essing Centers (“SPC”), Intergovernmental Service Agreement facilities 
(“IGSA”), and Contract Detention Facilities (“CDF”).97 SPCs, IGSAs, 
and CDFs house 13, 67, and 17 percent of the detainee population re-
                                                                                                                      
91 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1), 1229b(a) (2006). 
92 Id. § 1226(c)(1). The statute states that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into cus-
tody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in 
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.” Id. 
93 See id. § 1226(a) (stating that the Attorney General can release certain non-citizen 
offenders on parole or bond except those whose crimes fall under subsection (c), which 
includes the drug-based offenses); see also id. § 1226(c)(1)(B), (c)(2) (detailing that drug 
crimes lead to automatic detention and how the Attorney General can release a non-
citizen charged with a drug-based offense only if the protection of certain individuals is at 
stake and if the non-citizen can show that he will not be a danger to the community). 
94 See id. §§ 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(B) (making an alien that has a drug conviction other 
than a single possession of marijuana automatically deportable). 
95 Karen Tumlin et al., A Broken System: Confidential Reports Reveal Failures 
in U.S. Immigrant Detention Centers, Nat’l Immigration Law Center, at vi (2009), 
available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=9. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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spectively.98 While SPCs and CDFs are detention facilities built specifi-
cally for immigration purposes, IGSAs are typically state or county jails 
that contract with ICE to house immigrant detainees.99 This means that 
an LPR awaiting deportation proceedings following a controlled sub-
stances conviction has a strong likelihood of being detained in the 
same facility that houses violent criminals.100 
 Further complicating matters, immigration authorities use the na-
ture of the detention itself to induce immigrant detainees into signing 
“stipulated removal[s].”101 The stipulated removal originates from 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(d) and allows the Attorney General to enter into the 
equivalent of an immigration plea bargain.102 In this plea bargain, the 
immigrant waives his or her right to a trial or appeal in exchange for an 
immediate deportation.103 From 2001 to 2011, over 160,000 immigrants 
were deported via the stipulated removal procedure.104 While presence 
in the United States without papers made up most of the charges on 
which stipulated removal orders were based, drug crimes formed the 
second-most charges.105 Many immigrants have signed the stipulated 
removal in order to escape immigration detention facilities.106 Effec-
tively, many LPRs have signed away their right to remain in this nation 
because of the pressures caused by mandatory detention.107 
2. Drug-Based Crimes Prevent LPRs from Escaping Detention 
 The United States’ immigration laws allow for the release of de-
tained LPRs from detention centers at the discretion of the Attorney 
General; however, such a remedy is generally not available for LPRs 
convicted of any drug crime.108 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) states that during 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. The remaining 3% is made up of federal prisons. Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006); Tumlin et al., supra note 95, at vi. 
101 Jennifer Lee Koh et al., Deportation Without Due Process, Nat’l Immigra-
tion Law Center, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=6. 
102 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d); United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 675–76 (9th Cir. 
2010); Koh et al., supra note 101, at iii. 
103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d); Ramos, 623 F.3d at 675–76; Koh et al., supra note 101, at 
iii. 
104 Koh et al., supra note 101, at iii. 
105 Id. at 8. 
106 Id. at 2 (stating that “immigrants have reported being coerced to sign stipulated 
orders of removal or being pressured to accept stipulated removal as a way to get out of 
immigrant detention”). 
107 Id.; see Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1947 (noting many LPRs with solid legal claims 
have given up their day in court due to the mandatory detention process). 
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2006). 
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the removal period, the Attorney General cannot under any circum-
stance release from detention an LPR who was found deportable under 
Section 1227(a)(2).109 This means that a conviction for possession of 
Adderall or Xanax, or any other drug, depending on the relevant state 
law, will lead to automatic detention that the LPR cannot escape under 
any circumstances when he is in the removal period.110 
 Furthermore, while the removal period is supposed to last only 
ninety days under U.S. law, the Attorney General is authorized to detain 
a non-citizen convicted of a drug crime beyond the ninety-day removal 
period.111 An LPR charged with a drug-based offense can be detained 
for an indefinite amount of time.112 Even if the LPR is released after the 
ninety-day period, he will still be subject to supervision under regula-
tions prescribed by the Attorney General for the remainder of the re-
moval period.113 
3. Drug-Based Crimes Can Eliminate Any Possibility of Cancellation of 
Deportation 
 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) grants the Attorney General the ability to can-
cel the deportation of an LPR, including drug-related deportations.114 
This provision is specific to LPRs and requires three elements to be 
met: (1) the non-citizen was a permanent resident for at least five years, 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. The full text is as follows: “During the removal period, the Attorney General 
shall detain the alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attor-
ney General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) 
or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of 
this title.” Id. Notably, this section again does not distinguish between LPRs and other types 
of non-citizens. See id. 
110 See id. § 1226(c) (making any LPR charged with a drug crime automatically detain-
able; id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (making an LPR deportable for any violation involving con-
trolled substances, except one charge of possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana); 
id. § 1231(a)(2) (stating that the Attorney General cannot release an LPR charged with a 
drug crime from detention under any circumstances while the LPR is in removal proceed-
ings). The “removal period” is the time period that an LPR is in removal proceedings. See 
id. § 1231(a)(2). 
111 See id. § 1231(a)(6). 
112 See id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 1 (detailing how an LPR with two convictions of 
possession of marijuana was detained for multiple years). But see Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Department of 
Homeland Security’s seven-year detention of an LPR under Section 1231(a) was improper 
because the “removal period” terminated when the LPR was granted judicial stay of re-
moval, but the seven-year detention was nevertheless proper under Section 1226(a)). 
113 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), (6). 
114 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006). Notably, this section distinguishes between an LPR and 
other types of non-citizens. Id. 
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(2) the non-citizen has resided in the United States continuously for at 
least seven years, and (3) the non-citizen is not facing deportation due 
to an aggravated felony.115 This allows the DHS to automatically deport 
someone who was an LPR for five years and resided continuously in the 
United States for seven years, so long as the LPR was convicted of any 
drug-related crime within that seven-year time period.116 
 The third element of Section 1229b(a) is the most problematic 
because an “aggravated felony” is broadly defined.117 Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B), the definition of an aggravated felony for immigra-
tion purposes includes illicit trafficking of a controlled substance.118 In 
turn, a drug trafficking crime is defined as any felony under the CSA.119 
Under the CSA, a crime is a felony if the maximum term of imprison-
ment is more than one year.120 In sum, an aggravated felony for drug-
based deportation purposes is any drug crime that could potentially 
impose a prison sentence of a year or more.121 
                                                                                                                      
115 Id.; see also Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3 (explaining the cancellation 
of a removal procedure). 
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
117 See id. § 1101(a)(43)(B); Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 19.11 (detailing vari-
ous crimes that constitute aggravated felonies for deportation purposes). 
118 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
119 See id. (stating that the definition of “drug trafficking” crime can be found in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006) (stating that a “drug trafficking” crime is 
anything that would be a felony under the CSA). 
120 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2006) (stating that a “felony” 
for CSA purposes means “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or 
State law as a felony”); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (defining any crime that imposes a prison sen-
tence of more than one year as a felony); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 
(2013) (stating that “a noncitizen’s conviction of an offense that the Controlled Sub-
stances Act makes punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment will be counted as an 
‘aggravated felony’ for immigration purposes”). When a court is analyzing whether a state 
drug crime is an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes, it applies the “categori-
cal approach” to determine if the state offense is equivalent to the proscribed offense un-
der immigration law—which in this case would be the “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony. 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85. Thus, in order for a state drug conviction to be an illicit 
trafficking aggravated felony under immigration law, it must proscribe conduct that is an 
offense under the CSA, and the CSA must punish that offense as a felony (a possible pun-
ishment of more than one year). Id. at 1685. Interestingly, in Moncrieffe v. Holder the Su-
preme Court held that possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was not an aggra-
vated felony. Id. at 1686–87. Because the CSA makes distribution of marijuana a felony 
only if there is remuneration, and the Georgia statute under which the defendant was 
charged did not specify if the defendant needed to receive remuneration, it was unclear if 
the defendant had engaged in illicit drug trafficking as defined under the CSA, and thus 
he had not committed an aggravated felony because the government had failed to carry its 
burden of proof. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 802(13); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2), 3559(a); 21 U.S.C. § 802(13). 
It should be noted that whether or not the non-citizen has to be charged as a felon in addi-
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 In practice, this means that almost any drug-related crime other 
than simple possession of marijuana can lead to mandatory deporta-
tion because the prison terms for many of the offenses in the CSA are 
longer than one year.122 For example, possession of Adderall with intent 
to distribute is an aggravated felony and would make an LPR subject to 
mandatory deportation.123 Similarly, offering drug paraphernalia for 
sale is an aggravated felony for deportation purposes because the CSA 
imposes a prison sentence of up to three years for the sale of drug par-
aphernalia.124 
D. The Section 1229b(a) Cancellation of Removal Procedure 
 While Section 1229b(a) places the discretion to cancel a person’s 
deportation order in the hands of the Attorney General, in practice the 
authority is delegated to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
within the Department of Justice.125 If an LPR meets all of the require-
ments under Section 1229b(a), then he can apply for cancellation of 
removal by filing Form EOIR-42a.126 Much of the form is devoted to the 
inquiry of whether or not the LPR has resided in the United States for 
the statutorily mandated period, and whether he is eligible for relief in 
the first place.127 For example, one of the questions in Form EOIR-42a 
explicitly asks LPRs whether or not they have ever trafficked controlled 
substances.128 
                                                                                                                      
tion to receiving a prison term of a more than a year is unclear following Carachuri-Rosendo. 
See 130 S. Ct. at 2589. The Supreme Court’s holding was tailored specifically to recidivist fel-
ony charges, and it is unclear if a misdemeanor charge with a prison sentence of more than a 
year subjects an LPR to mandatory detention. See id. 
122 Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., Drug Offenses: Maximum Fines and 
Terms of Imprisonment for Violation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
and Related Laws 1–13 (2012). 
123 See id. at 3 (stating that possession with intent to distribute any Schedule II sub-
stance in any weight subject to imprisonment of up to twenty years); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 
(2012) (stating that Adderall—an amphetamine—is a Schedule II substance). 
124 See 21 U.S.C. § 863(a)–(b) (2006). 
125 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3(c) (explaining that 
Immigration Judges have discretion over Section 1229b hearings); Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 369, 371–72 (2006) (detailing 
the structural logistics of the deportation system). 
126 Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3(c); Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Form EOIR-42a (2013), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42a.pdf [hereinafter EOIR-42a]. 
127 See EOIR-42a, supra note 126, at 2. 
128 Id. at 6. More specifically, the question asks if the LPR has ever been “a trafficker of 
a controlled substance, or a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others 
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 In addition to filling out Form EOIR-42a, an LPR must provide 
evidence demonstrating that he should remain in the United States.129 
The Board of Immigration Appeals has stated that when an Immigra-
tion Judge exercises discretion in a Section 1229b(a) hearing, she 
“‘must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s undesirability 
as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations 
presented in his [or her] behalf to determine whether the granting of 
. . . relief appears in the best interest of this country.’”130 Relevant fac-
tors include the LPR’s legal history, evidence of good or bad moral 
character, the strength of the LPR’s ties to the United States, evidence 
of hardship to the LPR or his family, and any business ties to the United 
States.131 Following the submission of the evidence, the Immigration 
Judge will schedule a hearing where the LPR has an opportunity to tes-
tify regarding his fitness to remain in the United States.132 Ultimately, 
the final decision for whether or not the LPR is entitled to cancellation 
of removal will be in the hands of the Immigration Judge and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, should the non-citizen choose to appeal 
an adverse holding.133 
 There is a very important caveat to the cancellation of removal for 
LPRs—the Attorney General and his delegates may only issue four 
thousand cancellations of removal per year.134 This means that if an 
LPR is removable due to a crime relating to controlled substances, and 
                                                                                                                      
in any such controlled substance offense (not including a single offense of simple posses-
sion of 30 grams or less of marijuana)?” Id. 
129 Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3(c). 
130 In re C-V-T, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 
581, 584 (BIA 1978)). In In re C-V-T, an LPR was facing removal following his conviction for 
possession of cocaine. Id. at 8. This was the only crime the LPR had ever committed in his 
fifteen years in the United States. Id. at 13. The LPR filed for cancellation of removal, and 
the Immigration Judge denied the cancellation, partly because she did not believe that the 
LPR would face much hardship from deportation. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
reversed the Immigration Judge’s decision on the basis that there were enough counter-
vailing elements in his application, such as his minimal criminal record and the fact that 
the state prosecutor recommended against the LPR’s deportation. Id. at 13–14. Between 
serving his ninety-day prison term for possession of cocaine, and his subsequent manda-
tory detention for deportation purposes, the LPR spent eight months in a prison-like set-
ting. See id. at 7–8. 
131 See id. at 11; see also Ortiz-Preciado v. Mukasey, 294 F. App’x 299, 301 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that an Immigration Judge did not err in denying an LPR’s cancellation of re-
moval based on evidence that the LPR was living with and financially supporting an un-
documented alien). 
132 Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3(c). 
133 See In re C-V-T, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 7–8 (detailing the statutory regime concerning 
cancellation of removal for an LPR). 
134 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (2006). 
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would meet all the requirements of cancellation of removal, he may 
nevertheless be deported.135 8 C.F.R. § 1240.21 allows for an Immigra-
tion Judge to reserve his decision for when a number becomes available 
either in the current or subsequent fiscal year, but this could presuma-
bly extend the amount of time an LPR spends in detention.136 
 The next item that this note explores is the role—if any—that the 
judicial branch plays in mitigating the harsher aspects of these laws. As 
part of this analysis, the note will also explore the role of the Immigra-
tion Judges and the constitutional rights of LPRs. 
III. The Erosion of Judicial Discretion 
 The strong influence that the executive branch, through the ad-
ministrative immigration agencies, and the legislature exert over de-
portation law, begs the question of the judicial branch’s role in policing 
the boundaries of the deportation system.137 Indeed, the judicial 
branch plays a minimal role in deportation proceedings of LPRs, and 
in drug-based deportations particularly.138 Furthermore, even when the 
judicial branch has heard cases involving LPRs, the judiciary has re-
fused to grant any special recognition of LPR status.139 Thus, the re-
moval process is highly insulated from external judicial oversight, and 
LPRs are exposed to the harshest possible application of the deporta-
tion statutes.140 
                                                                                                                      
135 See id. 
136 See id. § 1226(c) (stating that the Attorney General shall detain an alien charged 
with any offense relating to a controlled substance except thirty grams of marijuana); 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.21(c) (2012); see also Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigra-
tion Judge, Executive Office for Immigration Review, to all Immigration Judges (May 17, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm11/11–01.pdf (detailing 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s procedures for dealing with cancellation of 
removal after the number quota has been met). 
137 See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History 
230 (2007) (noting the complicated relationship between discretion, deportation, and the 
role of the judiciary in the process) [hereinafter Kanstroom II]. 
138 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006) (limiting cancellation of removal to the Attorney 
General’s discretion). 
139 See Kanstroom I, supra note 41, at 1911–15 (detailing how non-citizens historically 
lost constitutional protections). 
140 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 380–81 (detailing the boundaries of the modern 
judicial review scheme over immigration matters). 
20 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:1 
A. The Judicial Branch’s Absence from the Deportation Process 
 Since 1952, the Attorney General and his delegates have wielded 
the authority to cancel removal, albeit subject to judicial oversight.141 
The judicial branch’s role in the cancellation of removals was historically 
limited to the typical administrative law judicial reviews, and the Judicial 
Recommendations Against Deportation (“JRAD”), which allowed crimi-
nal court judges to use their discretion to prevent deportation.142 The 
JRAD system could not be used against narcotics offenses, however, and 
it was abolished entirely in 1988.143 
 In 1996, Congress took steps to further limit the judicial branch’s 
administrative law oversight of agency deportation orders.144 Congress 
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which states that no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review final removal orders made under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B).145 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) states that courts will not 
have jurisdiction to review any agency decision regarding the granting 
of relief or any decisions or action of the Attorney General and DHS.146 
These statutes also eliminate a federal court’s habeas corpus powers.147 
Congress made one exception to this otherwise strict provision: Courts 
still have jurisdiction to review constitutional questions or questions of 
law.148 This means that courts are able to review an Immigration Judge’s 
interpretation of a statute or any constitutional issue.149 
 Taken as a whole, the provisions of Section 1252 effectively bar the 
courts from reviewing many important deportation matters.150 This in-
cludes whether or not the government properly instituted removal in 
                                                                                                                      
141 Kanstroom II, supra note 137, at 234. 
142 Id. at 228; Daniel Levy, U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Handbook § 8:8 
(2013) (explaining the powers that the JRAD had and its effectiveness in overcoming de-
portability, excludability, and the bars to good moral character). 
143 See The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran Act), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 
163, 204–07, 214–15 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (eliminating 
JRAD review of narcotics-based deportation proceedings); Kanstroom II, supra note 137, 
at 228. 
144 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2006); Kanstroom II, supra note 137, at 230–31. Federal 
judges were still using their powers over administrative law manners to scrutinize immigra-
tion agency decisions. Kanstroom II, supra note 137, at 230–31. 
145 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(B), 1252(a)(2)(C). Effectively, this means that courts 
have an extremely limited role to play when an LPR is facing deportation due to a drug-
based conviction. See id. 
146 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 
147 Id. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (stating that judicial review is barred for removal deci-
sions notwithstanding habeas corpus provisions). 
148 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
149 Id.; Legomsky, supra note 125, at 381. 
150 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(D) (2006); see also Legomsky, supra note 125, at 380–84. 
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the first place, whether the individual deserves favorable exercise of 
discretion, or whether the Immigration Judge gave sufficient considera-
tion to a question of fact.151 These restrictions on the judiciary mean 
that an LPR’s sole opportunity for some kind of judicial discretion is 
limited to a hearing before an Immigration Judge or the Board of Im-
migration Appeals.152 
B. Immigration Judges & the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals also 
face unique hurdles in exercising judicial discretion over drug-based 
deportation matters.153 Immigration Judges belong to the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which is an adjudicative 
agency under the Department of Justice.154 The role of the Immigra-
tion Judge is primarily to interpret the relevant immigration statutes.155 
Specifically, Immigration Judges decide whether a non-citizen is de-
portable and if so, whether or not the non-citizen is eligible for any dis-
cretionary relief.156 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is also under the um-
brella of the EOIR and the Department of Justice.157 The BIA is able to 
hear appeals from both the government and the non-citizen on almost 
every relevant immigration topic, including removal and detention.158 
The BIA’s decisions are considered final for administrative law pur-
poses, and appealing to a federal circuit court would have to be based 
on constitutional issues or questions of law.159 
                                                                                                                      
151 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 380–84. 
152 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (limiting the scope of judicial review by the fed-
eral courts). 
153 Legomsky, supra note 125, at 372–80 (detailing the political hurdles of Immigration 
Judges). 
154 Id. at 371–72. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 375. 
158 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2012) (stating that appeals may be filed with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals regarding the decision of Immigration Judges in situations including 
exclusion cases, deportation cases, removal proceedings, administrative fines and penal-
ties, and adjustment of status). 
159 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7). Note that there is an ex-
ception to the finality of the BIA’s decision, which occurs when the Attorney General at his 
own discretion decides to review a board decision in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). 
Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). The Attorney General rarely exercises this power. Legomsky, supra 
note 125, at 375 (stating that the Attorney General exercises his review power sparingly). 
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 Due to the strong and explicit nature of the deportation statutes, 
Immigration Judges and the BIA wield little effective discretion over 
cases.160 Their limited discretion is further compounded by the fact 
that they operate under the executive branch, which has a natural in-
terest in increasing deportations.161 This has led to an atmosphere 
where many Immigration Judges and the BIA feel that they imperil 
their employment if they rule against the government.162 In fact, in the 
early 2000s, the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”) 
proposed the establishment of a new immigration court that would be 
independent of the Department of Justice.163 The NAIJ reasoned that 
keeping Immigration Judges within the Department of Justice creates a 
“conflict of interest” that is “insidious and pervasive.”164 
 The pressures felt by these administrative agencies means that de-
portation decisions are free of legislative or political constraints only 
when an Article III judge is deciding a question of law or an issue with 
constitutional implications.165 This begs the follow up question: What 
kind of constitutional rights do LPRs have in deportation proceed-
ings?166 
                                                                                                                      
160 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 371–72 (detailing the statute-centric analytical pro-
cess Immigration Judges undertake when deciding immigration issues); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B) (demonstrating that its broad language leaves little room for judicial in-
terpretation). 
161 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 372–75 (detailing the internal pressures that Im-
migration Judges and the BIA have to deal with when ruling against other government 
agencies); Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1948 (stating that “Congress audits the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) [now DHS] enforcement efforts and treats any failure to 
deport expeditiously a person who fits the criminal alien label as evidence of the INS’s 
failure”). 
162 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 373. In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft an-
nounced that he was reducing the size of the BIA from twenty-three members to eleven in 
one year. Id. at 376. Within that one-year period, several BIA members began to rule in 
favor of the government at a greater frequency than they had before the Attorney Gen-
eral’s announcement. Id. at 377. 
163 Id. at 373. 
164 Id. (internal quotations omitted). It should be noted that Immigration Judges can 
only be removed for cause, but they may be reassigned at the discretion of the Attorney 
General. Id. at 373–74. 
165 Id. at 371–72. 
166 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (limiting judicial review to questions of law 
and constitutional issues). 
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C. Despite Their Relationship with the U.S. Government, an LPR’s 
Constitutional Rights Are Limited 
 Even though an LPR can seek judicial review of constitutional mat-
ters, this has proven to be a fruitless avenue because the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that LPRs have limited constitutional rights 
in deportation proceedings.167 The issue is perhaps best summarized by 
the case of Hariasades v. Shaughnessy, where LPRs faced deportation for 
being members of the communist party.168 The LPRs argued that “ad-
mission for permanent residence confers a ‘vested right’ on the alien, 
equal to that of the citizen, to remain within the country, and that the 
alien is entitled to constitutional protection [to remain in the country] 
to the same extent as the citizen.”169 The Supreme Court was not per-
suaded by the argument, reasoning that permanent residence status is 
a privilege granted to certain non-citizens, which the U.S. government 
is within its sovereign right to revoke.170 
 Effectively this means that from a constitutional standpoint, depor-
tation proceedings treat LPRs in the same manner as undocumented 
immigrants.171 Hariasades and subsequent holdings have left LPRs with 
little constitutional recourse to challenge the harsh effects that drug-
based offenses have on them compared to their citizen counterparts.172 
 For example, the issue of whether or not the government can con-
stitutionally place LPRs in detention without a hearing was the primary 
                                                                                                                      
167 See Kanstroom I, supra note 41, at 1911–15. Much of the legal justification for the 
harshness of deportation law stems from the idea that deportation is a civil procedure as 
opposed to a criminal procedure. See id. at 1894–95. 
168 342 U.S. 580, 581–82 (1952). 
169 Id. at 584. 
170 Id. at 586. “Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status [legal permanent 
residence] within the country is not his right but is a matter of permission and tolerance. 
The Government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by 
this Court since the question first arose.” Id. at 586–87. 
171 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that Congress may make 
rules for LPRs that would be unconstitutional for citizens); Bassett v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 581 F.2d 1385, 1386 (10th Cir. 1978). In Bassett v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., an LPR was deported after a conviction for possession of marijuana. 
581 F.2d at 1386–88. He tried to argue that the deportation violated “his rights to due pro-
cess and equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 1386. The Court expressly rejected that idea, 
citing to Hariasades v. Shaughnessy, among other cases. Id. at 1388. 
172 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2590 (2010) (finding for the LPR 
based on statutory construction rather than any constitutional ground); Lopez v. Gonzales, 
549 U.S. 47, 56–57 (2006) (finding for an LPR in a deportation proceeding based on statu-
tory construction rather than the constitution). 
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issue in Demore v. Kim.173 In Demore, an LPR challenged the constitution-
ality of Section 1226(c) on the basis that the statute violated his sub-
stantive due process rights because the immigration authorities auto-
matically detained him without determining whether or not he posed a 
flight risk.174 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that 
according to precedent, Congress can treat LPRs in a manner that 
would be unconstitutional if done to citizens.175 The Demore decision 
highlights the long-standing precedent that the Constitution does not 
apply to legal permanent residents in the same manner as it does to 
citizens, and thus LPRs cannot realistically rely on the Constitution for 
relief in deportation proceedings.176 The distinct problems that drug 
laws create are further compounded by the lack of judicial oversight, 
and the next section explores these unique problems.177 
IV. Drug-Based Deportations Cause Unique Problems 
 The fragmented nature of drug enforcement and the broad na-
ture of the deportation regime has created a peculiar set of legal chal-
lenges for LPRs.178 This section explores recent developments that fur-
ther fragmented drug enforcement in this nation, how these recent 
changes interplay with the current legislative regime, and how the cur-
rent immigration administration is incentivized to ignore these recent 
changes—and thus leniency—in deportation proceedings. 
                                                                                                                      
173 538 U.S. at 527–28. It should also be noted that there has been a long line of cases 
that have consistently held that LPRs do not have the type of constitutional rights in de-
portation proceedings that they would have in normal criminal proceedings. See Kan-
stroom I, supra note 41, at 1911–15 (summarizing some of the more prevalent cases). At 
this point, the weight of Supreme Court precedent against the proposition of greater con-
stitutional rights for LPRs in deportation proceedings may be too much to overcome. See 
id. 
174 Demore, 538 U.S. at 514. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) places LPRs convicted of a drug crime in 
mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006). 
175 Demore, 538 U.S. at 522. 
176 See id.; Bassett, 581 F.2d at 1386. 
177 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(D). 
178 See id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (highlighting the broad nature of drug-based deportations); 
Stephen B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological and Hu-
manitarian Disgrace, 9 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 17, 32–33 (2009) (detailing the increasingly 
divergent nature of drug enforcement in the U.S. and worldwide). 
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A. The Changing Drug Landscape 
 Since its beginning in the 1980s, the War on Drugs has garnered 
widespread academic criticism.179 Among other things, the War on 
Drugs has been criticized for being too costly, ineffective, and dispro-
portionate in its treatment of racial minorities.180 As a result, many 
Americans have begun to adopt a more tolerant view of drugs.181 In 
fact, fewer Americans are opposed to the legalization of marijuana than 
at any time in recent history.182 This more accepting attitude has mani-
fested itself in recent state laws.183 
 For example, in November 2000, California voters passed Proposi-
tion 36, a response to the perceived failure of the War on Drugs.184 Un-
der the new California law, possession of a narcotic for personal use 
receives only probation.185 In 2008, Massachusetts voters passed the 
Massachusetts Sensible Marijuana Policy Initiative, which decriminal-
ized possession of one ounce of marijuana completely, making posses-
sion a mere civil penalty.186 Most significantly, Washington and Colo-
rado fully legalized recreational use of marijuana in 2012.187 
                                                                                                                      
179 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 57, at 97–102 (explaining how the War on Drugs 
has created a racial caste system by disproportionately targeting people of color); Mike 
Gray, Drug Crazy: How We Got into This Mess and How We Can Get Out 196–97 
(1998). 
180 See Alexander, supra note 57, at 97–102 (detailing the disparate treatment people 
of color receive from drug enforcement); War on Drugs, supra note 56, at 1. 
181 Amie L. Nielsen, Americans’ Attitudes Toward Drug-Related Issues from 1975–2006: The 
Roles of Period and Cohort Effects, 40–2 J. Drug Issues 461, 486 (2010). 
182 Id. at 474. 
183 See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1 (West 2004); Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32L (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013 (2012). 
184 See Gardner v. Schwarzenegger, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1370 (1st Dist. 2009). The 
following text was on the ballot: 
The war on drugs has failed. Nonviolent drug users are overcrowding our 
jails. Violent criminals are being released early. Drug treatment programs are 
rarely available. We pay $25,000 annually for prisoners when treatment costs 
only $4,000. Expanded treatment programs will reduce crime, save lives, and 
save taxpayers hundreds of millions. 
Id. (quoting Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., summary of Prop. 36, 3 (Nov. 7, 2000)). 
185 Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1. 
186 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32L. The statute states that possession of one ounce or 
less of marijuana “shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender who is eighteen years 
of age or older to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana, 
but not to any other form of . . . punishment or disqualification.” Id. 
187 Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.4013; see also Wash. 
Sec’y of State, Initiative Measure No. 502, (Jul. 08, 2011), available at http://sos.wa.gov/_ 
assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf; Press Release, State of Colo., Gov. Hickenlooper Signs 
Amendment 64 Proclamation, Creates Task Force to Recommend Needed Legislative Ac-
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 In addition to outright legalization of certain drugs, a small num-
ber of states have reformed their drug laws to be more lenient.188 For 
example, in the 2000s, New York reduced prison terms for drug crimes 
and made the elements of certain drug-related crimes more difficult to 
meet.189 All of the states that have engaged in some form of decrimi-
nalization or legalization followed the same basic policy rationale: it is 
not fair to incarcerate addicted individuals and it is too costly to con-
tinue doing so.190 
 There have been signs even at the federal level that the United 
States may rethink its drug policy.191 For example, in 2008, President 
Obama ran on a drug policy platform to abolish mandatory minimum 
sentences, support the creation of drug courts, and eliminate the dis-
parity in punishments between crack cocaine and powder cocaine.192 
Additionally, in 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 
the federal government would cease conducting raids on California’s 
medical marijuana dispensaries.193 Finally, it is worth noting that the 
United States has had two presidents in the past twenty years that have 
openly admitted to prior drug use.194 While these new laws and policies 
reduce the criminal offenses for which an LPR can be convicted, they 
                                                                                                                      
tions, (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/ 
CBON/1251634887823. 
188 See, e.g., Edward J. Maggio, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, Then and Now, N.Y. St. 
B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 30, 34 (detailing how New York’s drug laws were diluted in the 
2000s); Andrea Lofgren, Note, A Sign of Things to Come? Drug Policy Reforms in Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and New York, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 773, 781–84 (2011) (explaining the 
changes that occurred in Arizona, California, and New York’s drug laws, making them 
more lenient overall). 
189 See Maggio, supra note 188, at 32–34. The New York law doubled the weight of 
drugs that an offender needed to possess in order to be charged with a crime. Id. at 33. 
190 See Lofgren, supra note 188, at 784–91 (stating that “[t]wo themes motivated the re-
forms in Arizona, California, and New York: treating drug offenders as addicts in need of 
medical rehabilitation and saving money for state taxpayers”). 
191 See, e.g., M. Alex Johnson, DEA to Halt Medical Marijuana Raids, NBCNEWS, Feb. 27, 
2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29433708/#.USFbBJNeuAY (last visited Jan. 24, 2013); 




192 See Obama Platform, supra note 191. 
193 See Johnson, supra note 191. But see Kate Linthicum & Andrew Blankstein, U.S. Raids 
Pot Shops, Warns Operators, L.A. Times, Sept. 26, 2012, at AA3 (stating that the Attorney 
General’s stance on marijuana dispensaries was short lived because California’s dispensa-
ries led to illegal profiteering). 
194 Alexander, supra note 57, at 251 (noting that President Bill Clinton admitted to 
using marijuana, and President Barack Obama admitted to using marijuana and cocaine). 
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have also made it so that conduct that is legal in one state can lead to 
deportation in another.195 
B. The Broad Language of Section 1227(a)(2)(B) Has Created a Strict & 
Inconsistent Drug-Based Deportation Regime 
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) states that any conviction relating to 
controlled substances, other than a single conviction for possession of 
less than an ounce of marijuana, makes an LPR deportable.196 Similarly, 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) directs the Attorney General, acting through ICE, to 
place any non-citizen that is deportable due to Section 1227(a)(2)(B) 
in detention.197 LPRs have access to relief from deportation for drug-
related crimes only in very specific circumstances, and this relief is 
completely unavailable if the drug-related crime carries a potential sen-
tence of a year or more under federal law.198 The broad nature of these 
statutes means that despite the advancements in the decriminalization 
of drugs, LPRs are still subject to bizarre deportation scenarios even in 
the decriminalizing states.199 
 The broad definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes 
could expose LPRs to detention and deportation in states that impose 
lesser criminal penalties, like probation, on drug offenses.200 A convic-
tion for deportation purposes includes any court-imposed penalty fol-
lowing a formal finding of guilt.201 This means that states that impose 
probation and treatment rather any jail time are nevertheless exposing 
LPRs within their borders to potential immigration consequences.202 
For example, California does not impose any jail time for possession of 
                                                                                                                      
195 Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32L (2012) (making possession of marijuana a 
civil infraction), with Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-2, -30 (2011) (making first time possession of 
marijuana a criminal misdemeanor, and a subsequent conviction for possession a felony with 
a one-year minimum sentence). For example, possession of marijuana can lead to incarcera-
tion and deportation in Georgia but not in Massachusetts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) 
(2006) (making two convictions of possession of marijuana a deportable offense); Ga. Code 
Ann. §§ 16-13-2, -30; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32L. 
196 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
197 Id. § 1226(c). 
198 Id. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1229b(a); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) 
(2006); (stating that an aggravated felony is any drug trafficking crime under the CSA, and 
the CSA, in turn, defines a drug trafficking crime as any crime that carries more than a 
one-year sentence). 
199 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(B), 1229b(a). 
200 Id. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (effectively defining a “conviction” as any finding of guilt that 
imposes a penalty on the non-citizen). 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
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a controlled substance; California only requires probation and treat-
ment.203 Nevertheless, because probation is still a court-imposed pen-
alty following a finding of guilt, it is still a conviction for immigration 
purposes, and an LPR could be subject to detention and deportation 
despite not seeing any jail time for his drug offense.204 Additionally, 
even in the states that have fully decriminalized certain drugs, drug-
related acts are still illegal under federal law, and LPRs could face de-
portation if apprehended by federal authorities and charged under 
federal law.205 
 In many states with reformed drug laws, non-citizens can still be 
deported under the expansive “relating to” language in Section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i)206 The words “relating to” mean that inchoate and 
auxiliary drug-based offenses are treated the same as full drug crimes 
for deportation purposes.207 For example, in Luu-Le v. I.N.S., a legal 
permanent resident was charged with a state misdemeanor for posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia.208 The LPR argued that the language of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B) did not apply to drug paraphernalia.209 The circuit 
court held otherwise, stating that the “‘relating to’ language” of 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) encompassed crimes involving drug parapherna-
lia.210 The LPR was subsequently deported—possession of drug para-
                                                                                                                      
203 Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1 (West 2004) (making possession of a controlled sub-
stance punishable by probation). 
204 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006) (stating that a court-imposed penalty is a convic-
tion for immigration purposes); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (making a non-citizen deportable if 
he is convicted of more than one possession of marijuana offense); Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1210.1. This is especially harsh in California because the statute allows for a court to set 
aside a possession of a controlled substance conviction if the defendant successfully com-
pletes treatment, but his probation remains a conviction for immigration purposes. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A); Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(e)(1). 
205 Compare Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16, and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.4013 
(2012) (making possession of marijuana not subject to any criminal or civil penalty), with 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006) (making individuals who possess 
controlled substances, including marijuana, subject to a criminal penalty). 
206 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (stating that the statute is violated for any convic-
tion relating to controlled substances); see also Luu-Le v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the “relating to” language in § 1227(a)(2)(B) is interpreted broadly). 
207 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); Luu-Le, 224 F.3d at 915–16 (giving examples of the 
types of crimes that the “relating to” language covers). 
208 Luu-Le, 224 F.3d at 913. Interestingly, the opinion does not provide much in the 
way of the petitioner’s background. See id. For example, the opinion does not state how 
many years the petitioner lived in the United States, whether he had family, and whether 
his single misdemeanor conviction for drug paraphernalia was his only crime. See id. at 
913–14. 
209 Id. at 913. 
210 See id. at 915–16 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i)). It should be noted that this 
case was decided in the transition period following the passage of IIRIRA in 1996. See id. at 
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phernalia serving as the sole basis for his deportation.211 Today, posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia is still illegal in many states, including Mas-
sachusetts.212 This means that a single conviction in Massachusetts for 
possession of marijuana paraphernalia could make an LPR deportable 
even though possession of marijuana itself will not.213 
 While many citizens now realize that drug addiction is a disease, 
U.S. deportation policy does not reflect this understanding.214 DHS can 
still deport a non-citizen, including an LPR, for being a drug addict.215 
This means that for LPRs suffering from drug addiction, seeking any 
kind of medical help can lead to detention and deportation.216 For ex-
ample, if an LPR in Colorado were to check into a rehabilitation center 
for an addiction to marijuana and DHS found out, he could be de-
ported under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii), simply on the basis of being 
a drug addict.217 
 The ever-expanding definition of what constitutes a controlled 
substance also creates dangerous scenarios for LPRs.218 For example, 
commonly used drugs for anxiety disorders or attention deficit disor-
                                                                                                                      
913. INS entered deportation proceedings against the LPR in 1993, and the LPR’s argu-
ments involved the pre-IIRIRA deportation laws. See id. It is unclear from the decision 
whether or not the LPR was in detention from 1993 until the circuit court’s final decision 
in 2000. See id. 
211 See id. at 916. 
212 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32I (2012) (stating that “[n]o person shall sell, possess 
or purchase with intent to sell, or manufacture with intent to sell drug paraphernalia, 
knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to 
. . . introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter”). 
213 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)(2006); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, §§ 32I, 32L. 
214 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (making any drug addict deportable); Lofgren, su-
pra note 188, at 784–91 (detailing the United States’ changing perception on drug addic-
tion as a disease rather than a crime). 
215 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). On at least one occasion, a non-citizen has been 
deported for simply being a drug addict. See Pondoc Hernaez v. I.N.S., 244 F.3d 752, 753 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
216 Pondoc Hernaez, 244 F.3d at 753–55. In Pondoc Hernaez v. I.N.S., the non-citizen regis-
tered at a drug rehabilitation facility and informed INS of that fact when he was seeking an 
alien registration receipt card. Id. INS subsequently placed the non-citizen in removal pro-
ceedings and successfully deported the non-citizen following the circuit court’s affirmation 
of the Immigration Judge’s decision. Id. at 755, 758. 
217 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that “[a]ny alien who is, or at any time af-
ter admission has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable”); Colo. Const. art. XVIII, 
§ 16 (legalizing possession of marijuana). 
218 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (stating that the definition of “controlled substances” 
stems from 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) of the CSA); see also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(6) (2006) (stating that any of the substances within its numerous “schedules” are 
controlled substances); id. § 811(a) (allowing the Attorney General to expand the sub-
stances within the CSA’s schedules). 
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ders are legally considered controlled substances.219 This means that if 
an LPR is caught with any number of medically useful drugs, either be-
cause he did not have a prescription or because the prescription had 
expired, he faces automatic detention and possible deportation.220 Be-
cause the list of controlled substances is ever expanding, many LPRs 
may be caught unaware that certain medically viable drugs could lead 
to deportation should they ever possess those drugs without a prescrip-
tion.221 
 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)’s exception for cancellation of removal and 
Section 1229b(e)’s numeric limits on cancellation of removal further 
exacerbate the consequences stemming from the broad language of 
Section 1227(a)(2)(B).222 The fact that an individual is not eligible for 
relief unless he has resided in the country for a significant amount of 
time potentially eliminates relief for a number of LPRs.223 For instance, 
if a non-citizen lived in the United States for six years before becoming 
a permanent resident, and four years later was convicted for either pos-
session of drug paraphernalia, possession of Ritalin without a prescrip-
tion, or for checking into a drug rehabilitation clinic, the he would face 
automatic deportation.224 There would be no inquiry into his connec-
tions to the United States, whether he is leaving family behind, whether 
he has a criminal record, or whether his drug addiction is his only neg-
ative personal issue.225 Even if relief was available via Section 1229b(a) 
and the Immigration Judge held that the LPR should not be deported, 
                                                                                                                      
219 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–.15 (2012) (labeling Xanax, Ritalin, and Adderall con-
trolled substances); Lisa Miller, Listening to Xanax, N.Y. Mag., Mar. 18, 2012, http://nymag. 
com/news/features/xanax-2012–3/ (detailing the popularity of Xanax). 
220 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.104, .117 (2010) (Texas statute label-
ing Xanax a controlled substance and making it a crime to possess without a prescription); 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010) (holding that an LPR was de-
portable following his conviction for possession of one Xanax tablet without a prescrip-
tion); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–.15 (DEA regulations labeling Xanax a controlled substance). 
221 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(B), 1229b(a) (2006) (making any non-citizen with a 
conviction relating to a controlled substances violation deportable and limiting cancella-
tion of removal only to non-citizens that have been LPRs for five years, lived continuously 
in the U.S. for seven years, and have not been convicted of an aggravated felony). Compare 
21 U.S.C. § 812 (listing illegal drugs that Congress has codified), with 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11–
.15 (containing a broader list of illegal drugs than those Congress codified). 
222 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), (e) (placing restrictions on when an LPR can apply for can-
celation of removal due to the automatic deportation presumption of § 1227(a)(2)(B)). 
223 Id. § 1229b(a). 
224 See id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(B), 1229b(a). 
225 See id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(B), 1229b(a). 
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the LPR could nevertheless be deported if the yearly quota for cancella-
tion of removal had already been filled.226 
 At the very least, the LPR will face mandatory detention for a drug 
crime, no matter how minor.227 This means that many LPRs will lose 
months of their lives, and presumably any employment they held at the 
time, in a detention center for acts that are not even considered crimes 
in certain states.228 
C. The General Make-Up of the Immigration Administration Places  
LPRs at a Disadvantage 
 The issue as to whether or not immigration officials would actually 
deport a long-time LPR for possessing drug paraphernalia may seem 
harsh, but the pressure that DHS faces to increase deportations is very 
real.229 Congress regularly audits immigration agencies and scolds them 
whenever they fail to deport criminal non-citizens in an expeditious 
manner.230 As a result, DHS has begun setting increasingly ambitious 
yearly quotas for deportations.231 
 Additionally, congressional pressure has led DHS and ICE to use 
their impressive administrative interpretive power to render LPRs both 
more deportable and ineligible for relief from deportation.232 This tac-
tic manifests itself in case law and some notable examples include I.N.S. 
v. St. Cyr, Lopez v. Gonzales, and Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder.233 
                                                                                                                      
226 See id. § 1229b(e). 
227 See id. § 1226(c). 
228 See id. Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32L (2012) (making possession of mari-
juana a civil infraction), with Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-2, -30 (2011) (making first time pos-
session of marijuana a criminal misdemeanor, and a subsequent conviction for possession 
a felony with a one-year minimum sentence). 
229 See Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1948. All of this takes place during the regular con-
gressional reviews of government agencies. Id. 
230 Id. (stating that “Congress audits INS [now DHS] enforcement efforts and treats 
any failure to deport expeditiously a person who fits the criminal alien label as evidence of 
the INS’s failure”). 
231 See Leaked ICE Internal Memo, supra note 29 (making reference to a quota); Lo-
negan, supra note 13, at 77 (stating that DHS’s annual report “reads like a corporate news-
letter, boasting of a greater number of criminal deportations than in previous years”). 
232 See Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1948; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that when Congress implicitly dele-
gates authority to an agency, such as DHS or ICE, “a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administra-
tor of an agency”). 
233 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2580; Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006); 
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292 (2001). 
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 In St. Cyr, the government argued that the IIRIRA had eliminated 
an LPR’s habeas corpus right.234 Similarly, in Lopez, the government 
argued that a crime that was a felony under state law but a misde-
meanor under the CSA was the equivalent of an aggravated felony for 
deportation purposes.235 Perhaps the most extreme example is Cara-
churi-Rosendo, where DHS argued that the Immigration Judge should 
consider an LPR, whose only crimes were two misdemeanors, a felon 
because he could have hypothetically been charged as a recidivist felon 
under federal law.236 With such a pro-deportation attitude and a near 
limitless legislative authority to engage in drug-based deportations, 
DHS has set a new record every year for deportations—with drug-based 
deportations comprising the majority of criminal deportations.237 
 In addition to the natural pressures that the executive branch faces 
in increasing the deportation of non-citizens, the fact that the executive 
branch has full oversight of the immigration process creates other 
problems.238 In the United States, the executive branch has discretion 
in determining the deportable crimes, how to prosecute those deemed 
deportable, and how to apply the existing immigration law, all while 
enjoying near limitless insulation from judicial interference thanks to 
legislative barriers.239 When Immigration Judges or the BIA hold in fa-
                                                                                                                      
234 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298. It should be noted that the Supreme Court found for the 
permanent resident, and in response Congress explicitly eliminated habeas relief for im-
migration detainees. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006) (explicitly eliminating habeas 
corpus relief for removable non-citizens); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314. 
235 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 51. 
236 In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 390–91 (BIA 2007). DHS argued “that 
any correspondence between a ‘state possession crime’ and the Federal felony of ‘recidivist 
possession’ could be established by means of a purely hypothetical inquiry . . . whether he 
has a criminal history that could have exposed him to felony treatment had he been prose-
cuted federally.” Id. at 390. It should be noted that even DHS realized the implications of 
that argument and eventually retreated from it. Id. at 391. 
237 See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 56, at 102; Simanski & Sapp, supra 
note 36, at 6; News Release, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE An-
nounces Year-end Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New 
National Detainer Guidance for Further Focus Resources (Dec. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm. 
238 See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 Geo. Im-
migr. L.J. 595, 647 (2009) (similarly criticizing the immigration adjudicatory process); 
Legomsky, supra note 125, at 408–09 (criticizing the lack of judicial independence in im-
migration proceedings). 
239 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (eliminating judicial review in deportation matters ex-
cept in questions of law or the Constitution); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 811 
(2006) (granting the Attorney General and the DEA the power to extend the list of illegal 
substances to any other substances that meets Section 811’s criteria); see also Carachuri-
Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2582; Lopez, 549 U.S. at 51; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298 (highlighting the 
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vor of an LPR, they are in essence entering a judgment against their 
direct employer, which some scholars believe leads to an inherent pro-
deportation bias in immigration proceedings.240 Furthermore, there 
has been at least one instance where the Attorney General’s interfer-
ence with the BIA makeup due to political reasons led to BIA decisions 
that certain circuit courts derided as “literally incomprehensible” and 
“so inadequate as to raise questions of adjudicative competence.”241 
  In the past fifteen years, many citizens have come to realize the 
practicality of more lenient drug laws.242 Nevertheless, LPRs continue 
to face a legislative and administrative drug-based deportation regime 
largely unaffected by these developments.243 Citizens have realized that 
not all drug crimes are equal, and it is only fair that some of the recent 
legal leniency trickle down to LPRs at the federal level.244 
V. Restoring the Permanence in Legal Permanent Resident 
 The detrimental effects of deportations on families are well docu-
mented.245 For LPRs, deportation is particularly severe because they 
are—by definition—non-citizens that are seeking to remain perma-
nently in the United States.246 Furthermore, LPRs have an established 
legal relationship with the United States that mostly makes them legal 
equals to naturalized citizens except in one very important situation— 
deportation.247 
 Given the changing attitudes on drugs, the incredible likelihood of 
drug crimes leading to deportation, the draconian scenarios that the 
United States’ deportation laws create, and the legal relationship per-
manent residents enjoy with the nation, it is only fair to change the 
                                                                                                                      
extremes to which the immigration authorities will interpret statutes so as to make LPRs 
automatically deportable). 
240 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 373. 
241 See Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); Niam v. Ash-
croft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Legomsky, supra note 125, at 375–78 (ex-
plaining how much of the criticism originated with the Attorney General’s attempt to 
streamline the immigration appellate process, but really was driven by a desire to remove 
pro-immigration board members, and how it subsequently led to serious procedural defi-
ciencies). 
242 See Duke, supra note 178, at 32–33. 
243 See Legomsky, supra note 125, at 408–09. 
244 See Lofgren, supra note 188, at 784–91 (stating that some states were frustrated with 
the negative impacts of harsh drug laws and amended their statutes to be more lenient). 
245 See, e.g., Lonegan, supra note 13, at 79; Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1950–54 (devot-
ing an entire section to the impact of deportation on families). 
246 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006). 
247 Lonegan, supra note 13, at 57. 
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current deportation regime to mitigate some of its harsher out-
comes.248 This note proposes three alternative methods by which the 
United States can make the deportation process more fair to LPRs and 
ensure that only those truly deserving are actually deported: (1) amend 
the existing legislation, (2) provide for full judicial oversight of the de-
portation process for LPRs, or (3) recognize that LPRs are entitled to 
some constitutional protections in deportation proceedings. 
A. Amending the Current Deportation Legislation 
 Perhaps the most efficient way to achieve a fair deportation system 
for LPRs is to amend statutes like Section 1227(a)(2)(B) and Section 
1226(c) to narrow their deportation and detention requirements to 
truly dangerous criminals.249 For instance, it is evident that by withhold-
ing relief from removal for non-citizens charged with a drug trafficking 
crime, Congress was attempting to expedite removal for non-citizens 
who were active participants in the drug trade.250 The problem is not 
with Congress’s intent, but rather with their decision to tie the defini-
tion of a drug trafficking crime to the length of the crime’s potential 
sentence.251 To resolve over-exclusivity, the definition of a drug traffick-
ing crime should be explicitly changed to the common sense under-
standing of the word: a trade or deal in illegal drugs within interstate 
commerce.252 
                                                                                                                      
248 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (establishing the status of LPRs); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) 
(making any non-citizen, regardless of legal status, deportable for any offense relating to 
controlled substances); Nielsen, supra note 181, at 486 (detailing how most Americans now 
hold a generally positive attitude towards decriminalizing marijuana); Simanski & Sapp, 
supra note 36, at 6 (indicating that the majority of criminal deportations in 2011 were drug 
based). 
249 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(B). Section 1227(a)(2)(B) currently punishes 
all drug offenses equally, and Section 1226(c) subjects non-citizens convicted of a drug 
offense to mandatory detention. Id. §§ 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(B). 
250 See id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (defining drug trafficking as an aggravated felony); id. 
§ 1229b(a) (withholding cancellation of removal from non-citizens convicted of an aggra-
vated felony); Morawetz, supra note 38, at 1944 (stating that when passing IIRIRA, Con-
gress was concerned with the number of criminal aliens in the nation’s prisons). 
251 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2), 3559(a) (2006); Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2006); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 
2580–81 (2010) (explaining how the statutes work together to render any drug-related 
crime that imposes a sentence of one year or more an “aggravated felony” for deportation 
purposes). 
252 See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53–54 (2006) (noting the odd definition of drug 
trafficking within the CSA and how it goes against the common sense definition). 
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 Additionally, it would be equitable to reserve deportation for re-
cidivist offenders.253 Due to the ever-expanding list of controlled sub-
stances, a one-strike possession policy can lead to overly harsh results. A 
three-strike policy appears to be the fairest solution because LPRs will 
likely be well aware of the deportation consequences, should they ever 
commit the third offense.254 Furthermore, this would allow LPRs to 
benefit from laws like those passed in California, which make posses-
sion of marijuana a civil penalty so long as the individual takes part in 
addiction treatment.255 This result would also be more in line with gen-
eral American attitudes regarding drug addiction as a disease rather 
than a crime.256 
 With these new definitions in hand, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) 
could be changed so that it applies solely to LPRs convicted of illicit 
drug trafficking or LPRs who have received three drug related convic-
tions.257 This would mitigate many of the harsh consequences of the 
current drug-based deportation regime.258 Minor drug crimes would 
no longer subject LPRs to mandatory detention and the possibility of 
mandatory deportation, and only professional criminal LPRs or delib-
erate repeat offenders would be subject to such provisions.259 
 A final concession of equity should be that every LPR subject to 
deportation should have the opportunity to apply for cancellation of 
                                                                                                                      
253 See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2589 (noting how possession for a single pill of 
Xanax made an LPR deportable even absent his previous conviction for possession of ma-
rijuana); Lonegan, supra note 13, at 81 (arguing that ICE should disclose rates of recidi-
vism of deportees). 
254 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 389 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“[s]tatutory provisions can remedy [deportation consequence] concerns in a more tar-
geted fashion”); Morton Memo, supra note 12 (stating the ICE should only pursue immi-
grants with three or more misdemeanor convictions). 
255 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (making drug addiction a deportable of-
fense); Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1 (West 2004) (making possession of marijuana a civil 
offense that is accompanied by mandatory rehabilitation). 
256 See Nielsen, supra note 181, at 486. 
257 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B); Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53–54 (explaining the common 
sense definition of illicit trafficking); Morton Memo, supra note 12. 
258 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(B); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2), 3559(a) (2006); 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2006); supra Part II (demonstrating the 
harsh regime created by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006)); see also Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53–
54 (noting the odd definition of drug trafficking within deportation law); Morton Memo, 
supra note 12 (demonstrating the Executive Branch’s recent apprehension in executing 
the deportation laws to their full capacity). 
259 See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53–54; Morton Memo, supra note 12. Mandatory detention of 
certain criminal non-citizens has merit because many criminal non-citizens have failed to 
appear at deportation proceedings in the past. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519–20, 
529 (2003) (explaining Congress’s reasoning for implementing mandatory detention). 
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removal.260 The consequences of deportation can be incredibly harsh, 
and it only seems fair to afford LPRs the same kind of examination into 
their character when removing their permanent status, as when grant-
ing it.261 
B. Restoring Judicial Oversight 
 An alternative method for making the deportation process fairer 
to LPRs, though perhaps not as immediately effective, is to restore judi-
cial oversight.262 The method for achieving this is twofold: (1) Immigra-
tion Judges and the BIA should be independent of the Department of 
Justice, and (2) the statutory provisions eliminating judicial review of 
immigration decisions should be removed.263 
 Given that the Department of Justice operates under the office of 
the President, and as such is subject to political pressures, it would be 
equitable to insulate the immigration adjudicatory process from the 
negative effects of politics.264 Moving the Immigration Judges and the 
BIA away from the influence of the executive could achieve this.265 Ad-
ditionally, eliminating the barriers on judicial review would allow Arti-
cle III Judges, an entity that is fully disinterested from the immigration 
process, the ability to ensure that equitable immigration procedures are 
being followed by giving them the power to question BIA findings of 
fact and exercise of discretion.266 These changes would ensure that 
                                                                                                                      
260 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (placing restrictions on which LPRs may seek cancellation 
of removal); Legomsky, supra note 125, at 409 (arguing for judicial review of every depor-
tation case). 
261 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (detailing the extensive grounds of inadmissibility 
that would prevent a non-citizen from obtaining LPR status); see also Brozovich, supra note 
43, at 430 (detailing the specific hurdles that immigrants have to overcome in order to 
become LPRs); Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 43, at 138–40 (explaining that “[a]chieving 
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262 Family, supra note 238, at 603–04 (detailing the criticisms that Immigration Judges 
face); Legomsky, supra note 125, at 408–09. 
263 Legomsky, supra note 125, at 404–09 (stating that “Congress should both restore de-
cisional independence to the administrative process (at both the initial hearing and the 
administrative appeal stages) and repeal the 1996 and subsequent limitations that it has 
imposed on judicial review”). 
264 See id. 
265 See id. at 375–76 (detailing how the Attorney General has interfered with the immi-
gration adjudicatory process due to political reasons). Recall that the National Association 
of Immigration Judges themselves had at one point advocated for this solution. Id. at 373. 
266 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(c) (2006) (eliminating judicial review of all immigration 
decisions except those involving questions of law or the constitution); Legomsky, supra 
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LPRs were given proper judicial oversight either when appearing be-
fore an Immigration Judge or when an Article III Judge is reviewing the 
BIA’s decisions.267 
C. Constitutional Rights in Deportation Proceedings 
 Substantial Supreme Court precedent states that deportation pro-
ceedings are civil in nature and thus not subject to the Constitution’s 
criminal due process protections.268 If deportation proceedings were 
treated more like criminal proceedings, LPRs would have greater pro-
tection from the harsher aspects of the deportation law, such as manda-
tory detention.269 In the case of Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court 
showed signs that it recognized the criminal-like nature of deporta-
tions, and that perhaps deportation proceedings should be held to a 
higher constitutional standard.270 
 In Padilla, Jose Padilla—an LPR of forty years and U.S. military 
veteran—faced mandatory deportation after being indicted on charges 
of possession of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and trafficking mari-
juana.271 Mr. Padilla entered into a plea bargain with the state after be-
ing assured by his lawyer that there was no danger of deportation be-
cause he had been in the United States for so long.272 Still, Mr. Padilla’s 
plea made him subject to mandatory deportation under Section 
                                                                                                                      
note 125, at 375, 408–09 (detailing the potentially destructive nature of executive interfer-
ence and the potential benefits of greater judicial oversight). 
267 See Greenberg, et al., supra note 45, § 20.5.3(c) (detailing an Immigration Judge’s 
limited role over a Section 1229b hearing); Legomsky, supra note 125, at 404–09. 
268 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: 
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-A-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1472 
(2011) (noting how Padilla v. Kentucky was the first time in nearly ninety years that the 
Supreme Court even attempted to address the fallacy of deportation as a civil procedure) 
[hereinafter Kanstroom III]; Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 43, at 143–46. 
269 See, e.g., Kanstroom II, supra note 137, at 19 (explaining that it is only fair that 
constitutional norms applicable to criminal cases should also apply to criminal deporta-
tions); Adriane Meneses, Note, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and 
Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation As 
Punishment, 14 Scholar 767, 829 (2012) (detailing some of the benefits that non-citizens 
would receive under the Constitution). 
270 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364; Kanstroom III, supra note 268, at 1467–73 (summarizing 
the Court’s holding and its significance). 
271 Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, at 1–2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 
2006). 
272 Id. at 2–3. 
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1227(a)(2)(B) and Section 1229b(a).273 Mr. Padilla argued that the 
Constitution entitled him to effective assistance of counsel regarding 
the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, and the Su-
preme Court agreed.274 The Court reasoned that deportation was not 
merely a civil collateral consequence to a criminal conviction due to its 
unique nature—a notable break from prior precedent.275 
 While the Supreme Court did not expressly acknowledge that de-
portation is a criminal procedure in Padilla, the Court nevertheless 
took an important first step in separating deportation from strictly civil 
procedures.276 If the Supreme Court were to take Padilla further and 
formally hold that deportation is not a civil procedure, then the nature 
of the deportation process would fundamentally change.277 If deporta-
tion was deemed a criminal process, courts would have to apply greater 
constitutional restraints on the deportation process, which could lead 
to the erosion of the current legislation’s harsher aspects and the im-
plementation of a fairer deportation system.278 
Conclusion 
 LPRs are in a unique status among the nation’s immigrants—in 
many ways, the law regards them as the equivalent of citizens. One of 
the key differences between LPRs and citizens is that LPRs convicted of 
drug crimes are subject to deportation. The launch of the War on 
Drugs in the 1980s led to an explosion in the number of individuals 
convicted for drug crimes, and non-citizens were included in that in-
crease. Using the increase in criminal non-citizens as a pretext, Con-
gress enacted stronger immigrations laws in 1996. The new laws made it 
easy for LPRs to be placed in detention and automatically deported for 
drug crimes, and the new laws also reduced oversight from the judicial 
                                                                                                                      
273 Id. The record did not refute Padilla’s allegation that he received mistaken advice. 
Id. at 7. Nor did the record refute Padilla’s allegation that he would not have accepted the 
plea if he had known of the deportation consequences. Id. 
274 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 374–75. 
275 Id. at 364–66; Kanstroom III, supra note 268, at 1462–63, 1481–82. 
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1928–31 (explaining the rationale and history behind the substantive due process model 
for deportation law); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
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278 See id. at 1350. 
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branch. Since then, deportations have increased every year, and drug-
based deportations have accounted for the majority of the criminal de-
portations. 
 In recent history, a movement has been underway in the United 
States to enact more lenient drug laws. Because of the 1996 laws, how-
ever, LPRs have not benefited from the more lenient drug laws to the 
same extent as citizens. Today, a drug-related act that would subject a 
citizen to a civil fine or no penalty at all can subject an LPR to manda-
tory detention and possible deportation. Congress and the courts can 
correct this imbalance in a number of ways: by amending existing legis-
lation, restoring judicial oversight, or granting LPRs facing deportation 
the same procedural rights that we grant individuals in criminal pro-
ceedings. 
 In Demore v. Kim, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “Congress regu-
larly makes rules [for non-citizens] that would be unacceptable if ap-
plied to citizens.”279 This line neatly encompasses the draconic and of-
ten unfair situation in which many LPRs find themselves. Many United 
States citizens have amended their respective state laws to better reflect 
changing attitudes towards drugs, and to ignore the needs of legal im-
migrants in this process would be truly unacceptable. 
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